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 Maps provide a base for all intelligence operations and strategic and tactical 
decisions, supporting the planning and execution of all battlefield functions. The 
development of military mapping support in South Africa, related closely to the 
development of aerial photography, may be divided into five, sometimes 
overlapping, phases. The first of these phases spans the years from 1840 to 1930 and 
is characterised by the gradual recognition that aerial photographs could be used for 
mapping. Two major conflicts – the Anglo Boer War and the First World War – 
marked this development. The Second World War is the key event of the second 
phase (1930–1950), which witnessed a rapid expansion of aerial photo coverage. 
The third phase (1945–1960) saw the overemphasising of interpretation techniques 
rather than the analytical use of results, which was rectified during the fourth phase 
(1955–1962) when the focus shifted to the applied uses of air-photo interpretation. 
During the third and fourth phases the topographic mapping support ability of the 
South African military was expanded.  The fifth phase (since 1960) commenced 
with the expansion of data gathering and analysis into portions of the 
electromagnetic spectrum beyond the small visible sector. During this period the 
protracted nature of the conflict on the northern border of Namibia (formerly South 
West Africa) and the war in Angola focused attention on the South African military 
mapping system. The National Service system allowed for the expansion of mapping 
units and the thorough mapping of large areas adjoining our borders. Through all 
five phases, mapping in the South African military has advanced from hand-
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produced maps to the utilisation of complex equipment that satisfies the 
sophisticated mapping needs of a modern defence force. 
This paper presents a brief history of both mapping support and the mapping 
units that have served within the South African theatre during the twentieth century. 
In doing so, the operational importance of topographic maps is also highlighted. 
1. Introduction 
“Those who do not know the conditions of mountains and forests, 
hazardous defiles, marshes and swamps, cannot conduct the march 
of an army” Sun Tzu, 400 – 321 B.C., The art of War.1 
“The tremendous volume of maps required by the armies of the 
world today leaves no doubt about their importance. Global war 
without reference to maps could not even be imagined, and in 
individual sectors the high mobility and speed of our new vehicles 
would be of little value without maps to guide them.”2  
These scholars highlight the vital importance of topographic mapping 
support to an efficient military practitioner. If these statements were true in 400 BC 
and in 1944, they are even more so on the modern battlefield. Yet, before outlining 
the history and development of topographical mapping support in the South African 
military, it is necessary to describe the process of mapmaking or cartography. 
Maps are a means of communication and a way to organise thought. Maps 
are created to transmit spatial information to its user and the success or failure of a 
map depends on its power to convey such information.3 The process of mapmaking 
are best described as the stating of a spatial need by a map user (in our case the 
military practitioner), and the satisfaction of that need by a skilled professional (the 
military surveyor / cartographer) by depicting the problem area (battlefield) on a 
map. The completed product may then be used, and in using the map, new needs can 
be identified and passed to the cartographer. Maps, then, provide a base for all 
intelligence operations, tactical decisions and tactical operations, and support the 
planning and execution of most other battlefield functions. 
                                                
1  Heinl RD Jr 1966. Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations. United States Naval 
Institute.  Annapolis, Maryland. p 218. 
2  Lobeck AK & WJ Tellington 1944. Military Maps and Air Photographs: Their Uses 
and Interpretation. McGraw – Hill Book Company, New York. p 1. 
3  Tyner J 1992. Introduction to Thematic Cartography. Prentice Hall, New Jersey. p 7. 
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2. The Anglo Boer War 1899 – 1902 
While some of the earliest British surveys were made in Egypt after the 
battle of Tel el Kebir (1882), the Anglo-Boer War provided the main impetus for 
systematic mapping in the British Army. In 1899 the only available maps on the 
Boer republics were a few sketches of farms. The first Mapping Section, sent out in 
that year, comprised two officers, four NCOs and a sapper. By the end of the war, 
there were four Survey Sections and three Mapping Sections in South Africa. During 
the war Captain Charles Close (later Arden–Close) RE oversaw the first complete 
map reproduction in the field – the surveying, drawing and printing of the maps – by 
the British Army.4  
Several sources comment on the unavailability of accurate maps for the 
British during the War.  Sir Richard Temple noted that  
“as to maps, there is the strangest misconception on the subject among many 
English people at home. Because maps exist in Europe it seems to be 
supposed that such things exist everywhere, or that if they do not exist the 
English Government can and ought to make them. Well, the English have 
managed to make maps of every coast, or almost every coast in the world; 
but when you come to make maps inland, that depends on whether the 
country is enemies’ country or not. If, of course, the enemy has made maps 
for himself and published them, we can get hold of them; but if he has not, 
then he will not let us make them, and we must do without them when we 
come to fight.”  
He concluded that Paul Kruger and M.T. Steyn had not allow mapping of 
their territories by the British prior to the war and that this accounted for the poor 
maps available to the soldiers during the early phases of the war.5  Temple of course 
did not mention that the British had done very little when the Boer republics were 
under British control. 
Many references are also made to the inadequacy of the existing maps. At 
the Tugela, Sir Redvers Buller had to rely on a survey done by the Field Intelligence 
Department and on a micro–filmed map sent by carrier pigeon from Ladysmith. The 
blueprint bore the bold legend that “vacant spaces indicate that data is wanting rather 
                                                
4  Hodson Y & A Gordon 1997. An Illustrated History of 250 years of Military Survey. 
Military Survey Defence Agency, s.l. p 14. 
5  Briggs L 1901. The Staff work of the Anglo – Boer War, 1899–1902: Embodying Some 
of the War Letters Sent to the “Morning Post” from South Africa. Grant Richards, 
London. pp 174-175. 
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than that the ground is flat!”.6  The inaccuracy of these maps contributed to the 
debacle at Colenso, for example when Major–General Sir FitzRoy Hart led his men 
into a loop of the Tugela and on to a wrong drift with the resultant loss of many 
lives.7  Due to this lack of good maps, sketches of the country were made and the 
ranges to important points measured with the artillery range–finder. Copies of these 
sketches were printed and issued to officers.8  According to Maurice9 the cost of 
compiling maps of the Transvaal and Free State on a scale of four miles to the inch, 
would have taken five years to complete, and at a cost of £150,000. The state of 
tension between the Transvaal Republic and Britain made such an undertaking 
impractical if not impossible. 
At the outbreak of the Anglo Boer War the British possessed maps on a 
scale of twelve and a half miles to the inch for the Cape Colony, the Orange Free 
State and a part of Natal. These maps were issued to their army in South Africa. For 
the Northern part of Natal two military maps were available. These, however, were 
known to be inaccurate and hopelessly out of date. In January 1900 a thousand 
copies of a survey of Transvaal farms were seized at Cape Town, and maps were 
compiled from them by the Field Intelligence Department and sent to the front.10 
On the Boer side, accounts regarding the availability and uses of maps differ 
from those of the British. According to many sources, the Boers used a system – in 
the first stages of the war, at least – of assigning Boer soldiers as close as possible to 
their home districts, so ensuring good local knowledge even in the absence of maps. 
Boer leaders, including such legends as C.R. de Wet, consulted with these soldiers, 
who briefed Boer commanders before battle.11  Officers were instructed to improve 
their knowledge of the “quick drawing of sketch maps of the terrain”. Although 
official sources do not indicate whether maps were used to plan battles and troop 
movements, the Boer republics were able to produce maps for this purpose: both 
                                                
6  Pakenham T 1995. The Boer War. Abacus, London. p 208. 
7  Breytenbach JH 1971. Die geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog in Suid–Afrika, 
1899–1902. Deel 2: Die eerste Britse-offensief, November–Desember 1899. Die 
Staatsdrukker, Pretoria. p 267;  Pakenham T 1995. The Boer War. p 227. 
8  Waters WHH 1904. The War in South Africa. John Murray, London. p 49. 
9  Maurice F 1906. History of the War in South Africa, 1899 – 1902. Volume 1.  Hurst 
and Blackett Limited, London. p 14. 
10  Maurice F 1906. History of the War in South Africa, 1899 – 1902. p 15. 
11  Pretorius F 1999. Life on Commando during the Anglo-Boer War 1899-1902. Human 
& Rousseau, Cape Town. p 211;  Rabie JE 1980. Generaal C.R. De Wet se 
krygsleiding by Sannaspos en Groenkop. SAW Dokumentasiediens, Pretoria. p 6;  
Breytenbach JH 1969. Die geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog in Suid–Afrika, 
1899–1902. Deel I: Die Boere-offensief, Oktober–November 1899. Die Staatsdrukker, 
Pretoria. p 133. 
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republics had a Department of the Surveyor General, which made accurate maps of 
every farm in the two republics.12 
The Boer forces had the following maps at their disposal: a map by F. and C. 
Jeppe of the South African Republic on a scale of 1 inch to 8 miles, published in 
189913; a map of the Orange Free State produced by J.J. Herfst in 1891, and also a 
map of the first two rows of farms on the Free State side of the border with the Cape 
Colony and Natal. The last map was produced at the insistence of President Steyn of 
the Free State at a conference in November 1898 and was specifically intended for 
military purposes. As far as the British Colonies were concerned, the Republics also 
had two military maps of Northern Natal. These were “produced during the previous 
wars on a scale of four miles and one mile to an inch”, as well as a map of the Cape 
Colony on a scale of 1 inch to 12½ miles, produced in 1895.14  
Yet, despite this, the Boers apparently preferred to operate without maps. 
Breytenbach gives one possible explanation for this.15 He concluded that most of the 
Burghers, and even their officers, had a poor understanding of geography and the 
reading of maps and rather used their phenomenal knowledge of the veldt in the 
planning and execution of battles. Most Boer soldiers had a good knowledge of vast 
areas of the Transvaal, Orange Free State and even parts of Natal and the Cape 
Colony from their campaign experience of 15 or more wars fought in the forty years 
preceding the Anglo Boer War.16  The very nature of the commando system meant 
that large numbers of Boers fought in some (even most) of these wars and as a result 
knew the military potential of areas far away from their homes without having to 
refer to maps. 
At the start of the Anglo Boer War both the British and the Boer forces had 
to rely on inaccurate, outdated maps produced on scales that made even the more 
accurate maps practically worthless for tactical purposes. The British responded to 
this by sending surveying and mapping units to the front and by updating existing 
maps, as opposed to the Boer generals who relied upon local knowledge. During the 
latter stages of the war the British had better maps at their disposal and could also 
                                                
12  Breytenbach JH 1969. Die geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog. pp 61,134-
135. 
13  This map, depicting relief features and drainage patterns as well as farm boundaries 
and names, was of high value for military purposes during the Anglo Boer War  
(Liebenberg E 2003. From Barrow to Jeppe – The development of 19th Century 
cartography in South Africa. Proceedings of the Simposium on The History of 
Cartography of Africa, Cape Town, South Africa, 4-5 August 2003, p 118). 
14  Breytenbach JH 1969. Die geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog. pp 134-135. 
15  Breytenbach JH 1969. Die geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog. p 134. 
16  Anon 1986. A Short Chronicle of Warfare in South Africa. Militaria 16(3) pp 40-47. 
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enlist the service of joiners who were as familiar with the terrain as the opposing 
Boer forces in the field. 
3. The First World War 1914 – 1918 
Although the necessity of a national mapping programme was discussed in 
1904, this never materialised due to a lack of funding. The British War Office 
mapped the Orange River Colony at a scale of 1:125 000 and the north–west Cape at 
1: 250 000, but not much mapping was done after that.17  The Union Defence Force 
(UDF) was established in July 1912 and two years later the UDF was subjected to its 
first campaign, the distant conflict in Europe bringing the invasion of German South 
West Africa.18  Although sources regarding this and the subsequent campaigns of the 
First World War are vague on the mapping support available to the South African 
forces, a few points may be deduced. 
Firstly, for the German South West Africa campaign, General Louis Botha 
utilised existing lines of communication for the launch of attacks.  This campaign 
was largely conducted according to the old Boer doctrine, with scouts undertaking 
the reconnaissance and then presenting briefs to their commanders. The use of maps 
was probably limited and the British War Office produced those in use.19 
Secondly, as Van der Waag has shown, until December 1917, the Union 
Defence Force was entirely dependent upon British sources for their intelligence. 20 
During the campaigns in East Africa, Europe and Egypt, the South Africans relied 
on British logistical support, and what was true for the British forces, probably 
applied to the South Africans as well. The First World War was the first war in 
which troops were provided in advance with adequate small–scale maps. As soon as 
the trench warfare started, larger scale maps were produced from 1:80 000 sheets, 
but were later compiled from aerial photographs and original surveys. These maps 
                                                
17  Chief Directorate Surveys and Mapping 2003. History of National Mapping in South 
Africa. [Online] Available: http://w3sli.wcape.gov.za/surveys/Mapping/maphist.htm 
[06.05.2003]. 
18  Dorning WA 1987. A Concise History of the South African Defence Force, 1912 – 
1987. Militaria 17(2)pp 3-4;  Nötling CJ 1994. Suid–Afrika in die Eerste 
Wêreldoorlog, 1914 – 1918. Suid–Afrikaanse Militêr–Historiese Konsultante, 
Silverton. p 23;  Bouch RJ (ed) 1977. Infantry in South Africa: 1652–1976. 
Documentation Service SADF, Pretoria. p 53. 
19  Bouch RJ (ed) 1977. Infantry in South Africa. p 53;  Dorning WA 1987. A Concise 
History of the South African Defence Force. p 4;  L’ange G 1991. Urgent Imperial 
Service: South African Forces in German South West Africa, 1914 – 1915. Ashanti 
Publishing, Rivonia. pp 141-142, 204. 
20  Van der Waag IJ 1995. Major J.G.W. Leipoldt, D.S.O.: A portrait of a South African 
Surveyor and Intelligence Officer, 1912–1923. Militaria 25(1) p 22. 
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were on a scale of 1:20 000. Aerial photography therefore opened a new chapter in 
the history of surveying and mapping and was used extensively during this phase.21  
In his article on Major J.G.W. Leipoldt, Van der Waag has also shed some 
light on surveying work done during and immediately after the First World War. 
During 1917 Major Leipoldt was called back from recuperative leave to survey and 
produce a topographical map of Saldanha Bay that had to be sufficiently precise to 
“allow the design of coast defences should they ever be required here” After 
completing this task he was transferred to Defence Headquarters as a first step in the 
creation of a small Intelligence Sub-Branch: the ‘I’ staff comprised Leipoldt and one 
non-commissioned officer. Their primary function was to gather intelligence inside 
the borders of the Union. Yet, despite the state of war, the Intelligence Sub-Branch 
spent an average of only £ 60.7.2 per month as at that stage the Union still received 
most, if not all, of her Intelligence from the British War Office.22  
4. Between two World Wars 1919 – 1938 
After the war Leipoldt’s small section was disbanded and no organised 
Intelligence existed in South Africa. In a 1920 report Leipoldt pointed out that the 
Union had no contemporary maps, road reports or reconnaissance surveys on the 
areas adjoining the border with Mozambique, and none whatsoever of the 
Portuguese territory itself. The report provided the impetus for the establishment of 
an Intelligence Section at Defence Headquarters in 1921 and of a national 
Intelligence Section in the office of the Chief of the General Staff on the 1st of 
September 1923. In terms of the Manual of Military Intelligence (1921), the War 
Office expected the Dominions to conduct do their own surveying and mapping and 
to present copies of these products to the War Office. The position of the Union 
Defence Force regarding maps was unenviable.  It lacked maps for more than half of 
the surface of South Africa itself.  Practically the whole coast was not suitably 
mapped to allow for military operations.23  In view hereof, Leipoldt appealed for the 
formation of a Survey Corps and when this did not materialise he resigned in April 
1923. The survey function was allocated to the South African Engineer Corps, 
which was established as part of the reconstituted Permanent Force on 1 February 
                                                
21  Hodson Y & A Gordon 1997. An illustrated history of 250 years of Military Survey.  
p 16. 
22  Van der Waag IJ 1995. Major J.G.W. Leipoldt, D.S.O. pp 21-23. 
23  Van der Waag IJ 2000. The Union Defence Force Between the two World Wars, 1919-
1940. Scientia Militaria 30(2) p 197. 
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1923.24 During 1936 a landmark decision was made to map the country at 1:50 000 
and that aerial photography be used for this purpose.25  
Leipoldt’s dream of a Survey Corps was partly realised on 1 April 1938 
when the First Field Survey Company was established as an Active Citizen Force 
unit of the South African Engineer Corps.  The foundations for future mapping and 
surveying in the South African military were thus laid. 
5. The Second World War 1939 – 1945 
Great Britain declared war on Germany in 3 September 1939 and a South 
African declaration followed three days later. South Africa’s wartime frontier was in 
Kenya, guarding against a possible invasion of British East Africa from 
neighbouring Italian colonies and on 20 December 1939 the British Government 
suggested move of South African forces to Kenya. Italy entered the war on 11 June 
1940 and the UDF troops moved north to East Africa.26 True to the peacetime 
practise of using civilians where possible, the UDF had appointed Mr William 
Whittingdale, Director of Trigonometrical Survey, as the military Director of 
Survey, with the rank of lieutenant colonel, as early as 7 January 1936. And, under 
the guidance of Major N.G. Huntley, then Assistant Director of Survey, the 1st Field 
Survey Company had been formed.  In May 1940 this unit was mobilised and on 3 
June the men were concentrated at Premier Mine for training before leaving for 
Nairobi.27  
5.1 The East African Campaign, June 1940 – November 1941 
The 1st SA Division was accordingly dispatched to East Africa to assist the 
hard-pressed British forces, who were endeavouring to hold an 800 mile front 
against Italian forces that had overrun British Somaliland and advanced southward 
into Kenya from their base in Abyssinia.28 As Orpen and Martin point out, in an 
undeveloped country like Kenya increasing road construction would be necessary to 
ensure mobility for the South Africans, who were building up the first fully 
motorised army ever seen in Africa.29 Almost the whole area across the frontier was 
                                                
24  Van der Waag IJ 1995. Major J.G.W. Leipoldt, D.S.O. pp 27, 31-34. 
25  Chief Directorate Surveys and Mapping 2003. History of National Mapping in South 
Africa. [Online] Available: http://w3sli.wcape.gov.za/surveys/Mapping/maphist.htm 
[06.05.2003]. 
26  Bouch RJ (ed) 1977. Infantry in South Africa. pp 139-140. 
27  Orpen N & HJ Martin 1981. Salute the Sappers. Part 1: The Formation of the South 
African Engineer Corps and its Operations in East Africa and the Middle East to the 
Battle of Alamein. Sappers Association, Johannesburg. p 21. 
28  Dorning WA 1987. A Concise History of the South African Defence Force. pp 4-5. 
29  Orpen N & HJ Martin 1981. Salute the Sappers. Part 1. p 22. 
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so densely wooded that vehicles could seldom move off existing tracks. Cross-
country movement by motor transport was extremely difficult and the inaccuracy of 
existing maps, which even ignored mountain ranges and depicted non-existent roads 
made planning more hazardous.30 Air reconnaissance helped little, as pilots found it 
almost impossible to judge the suitability of ground for cross-country motoring. 
Existing maps, suitable for strategic purposes, were tactically of little or no value, 
and planning of operations was therefor a gamble.31  
East Africa was largely uncharted and may have remained so, had it not 
been for South Africa: her Government Survey Department despatched a survey 
company to Kenya for that purpose. The 1st Field Survey Company, under Majors 
Walter F. Short and N.G. Huntley, comprised a Trigonometric Group of five 
sections: a Geodetic Section and an Instrument Repair Section as well as a Map 
Production Section and a Mapping (Photo-Topo) Group of two sections. The two 
sections of the Photo-Topo Group, whose personnel were trained and equipped to 
produce maps from either air photos or by ground methods, joined the Company in 
December, while the Lithographic Section of the Mobile Map Printing and Printing 
Company was attached to the Survey Company at about the same time.32 The 1st 
Field Survey Company with its Headquarters, complete with the necessary trained 
geodetic officers, computers, map production staff, draughtsmen, instrument 
repairers and other technicians were deployed in Kenya over the period July and 
December 1940. 
However vital transport was to success, roads and maps were of equal 
priority. With the accent on mobility, the vital importance of road and railway 
construction was obvious and called for survey support other than topographical 
mapping. When war began the only available maps were those made for district 
officers or by the Italians. All were grossly inaccurate, misplacing some geographic 
phenomena and even ignoring others.33 These poor maps and a lack of reliable 
information on cross-country routes and water supplies handicapped operations. 
According to Orpen the captured Italian maps which were drawn from aerial 
photographs were also inaccurate and therefore of little use.34   
                                                
30  Orpen N 1968. East African and Abyssinian Campaigns. Purnell, Cape Town. pp 27-
28. 
31  Anderson K 1964. Nine Flames. Purnell, Cape Town. p 43; Orpen N 1968. East 
African and Abyssinian Campaigns. p 95. 
32  Anderson K 1964. Nine Flames. p 45. 
33  Brown JA 1990. The War of a Hundred Days: Springboks in Somalia and Abyssinia, 
1940-41. Ashanti, Johannesburg. p 69. 
34  Orpen N 1968. East African and Abyssinian Campaigns. pp 136; 204. 
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The only map available for operations was an out-of date 1:1 000 000 series 
that was quite inadequate for military purposes. The official mapping of the area was 
therefore started on a 1: 500 000 scale using mainly data from Italian maps in 
addition to other sources. The 1st Field Survey Company had trained geodetic and 
map production staff, enlisted from the goldmines of the Witwatersrand, as well as 
draughtsmen and instrument repairers who could take a reconnaissance plane’s 
photographs and produce accurate maps without delay.35 Army printers made speedy 
on-the-spot reproductions in their mobile print shops so that when the men at the 
front went into action they were supplied continuously with maps that were 
sufficiently detailed for operational purposes. The 1st Field Survey Company 
delivered the first Kenyan maps by road on 26 December, only 11 days after the 
arrival of the two mapping sections from South Africa. The surveyors covered 240 
km in 12 days on foot under appalling conditions to make the necessary 
observations.36 Strip maps of important roads were compiled from aerial 
photographs supplied by the South African Air Force’s No 60 
(Survey/Photographic) Squadron. Maps were constantly revised, as new data 
became available from the detail gathered from these strip maps. Artillery maps on a 
1: 25 000 scale as well as large scale regional maps were also prepared from aerial 
photographs.37  
Their success in East Africa and experience gained there was of inestimable 
value to the SAEC.38 According to Wessels this campaign was an Engineers’ war, 
faced as they were with the enormous number of roads, bridges, airstrips and other 
construction work that had to be build, all an impossible task without prior 
surveying.39 The 1st Field Survey Company was redesignated the South African 
Survey Company and after completing the final, enormous task of compiling a 
gazetteer of more than 22 000 place names covering 54 maps for the East African 
Survey Group was transferred to Egypt through the Eritrean port of Massawa. 
 
                                                
35  Brown JA 1990. The War of a Hundred Days. p 70. 
36  Orpen N 1968. East African and Abyssinian Campaigns. p 65. 
37  Anderson K 1964. Nine Flames. p 44; Orpen N 1968. East African and Abyssinian 
Campaigns. pp 34-35; Orpen N & HJ Martin 1981. Salute the Sappers. Part 1. pp 69-
70, 78. 
38  Liebenberg EC 1973. Die topografiese kartering van Suid-Afrika, 1879-1972: ‘n 
Histories-geografiese ontleding. MA thesis, University of South Africa, Pretoria. p 
346. 
39  Wessels A 1995. Die aanwending van die Unie-Verdedigingsmagte in die tydperk 
September 1939 tot September 1941. Journal for Contemporary History  20(1)  p 16. 
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5.2 The North African Campaign, June 1941 – November 1942 
After arriving at Maadi, south of Cairo, the SA Survey Company 
commenced map production with Royal Engineer assistance and were assigned 
responsibilities all over the Middle East and North Africa, on a survey connection of 
Palestine, Egypt and Transjordan major triangulations.40 
Moving in a poorly mapped country, such as the Western Desert, where 
landmarks were rare, most units had great difficulty keeping track of their own 
locations at any given moment. At the end of each day the South African Engineer 
Corps’ surveyors were probably the only men with a column who could accurately 
fix its position by means of an astrofix to within less than a kilometre in about an 
hour. With more time available, providing dust, clouds or rain did not limit 
visibility, this might be done more accurately.41   
Though units in the forward areas may hardly have been aware of it, since 
their maps arrived as usual, back at Maadi on 2 April 1942 the SA Survey Company 
was changed to a Type B Survey Company (non operational). The commanding 
officer, Lt Col W.F. Short, 13 officers and 103 other ranks were struck off strength 
and posted to 45 Survey Company. Returned to South Africa, they conducted a crash 
survey of a strip, about 150km wide, around the entire Southern African coast from 
Mozambique to Angola, in view of the Japanese threat. They also trained troops, 
awaiting posting to North Africa, in survey work. From among the lines of 45 
Survey Company at the Ladysmith military base, 49 Survey Company was formed, 
only to join the North African and Italian campaigns at a later stage. A newly-
established Type A Survey Company (operational), redesignated 46 Survey 
Company, under command of Major N.T. Pascaul remained in North Africa with the 
field groups carrying on in the desert as before. On 9 July 1942, the Survey 
Company was placed on a completely mobile basis, so ushering in a new phase. The 
company was now capable of operating under field conditions more effectively than 
those envisaged for a British corps field survey company, though it was not 
immediately possible to move the whole unit into the field.42 
On 27 July 1942 the entire unit came under the operational command of the 
8th Army, and by 9 August the mobile detachment was on its way up to the Western 
Desert. Almost immediately the detachment began reprinting existing sheets as the 
                                                
40  Orpen N & HJ Martin 1981. Salute the Sappers. Part 1. p 208. 
41  Orpen N & HJ Martin 1981. Salute the Sappers. Part 1. pp 237, 240. 
42  Smith JR 1995. Capt RS Webb ,RFA(1892-1976). From Shropshire to Paarl via 
Geodesy and Lesotho. South African Council for Professional and Technical 
Surveyors, Johannesburg. p 39; Anderson K 1964. Nine Flames. p 20; Orpen N & HJ 
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field group surveyed them. As air cover extended, overprints depicting information 
about the enemy were made and the provision of adequate maps for future use by the 
8th Army daily approached completion. The Mobile Detachment produced block 
plots of the enemy defence line from air photos and some of the existing sheets 
produced by the original SA Survey Company the previous year, which proved to be 
highly accurate as the 8th Army’s counter-battery fire was particularly successful. A 
captured German document dated 18 September 1942, confirmed the enemy’s high 
regard for their accuracy. All work other than that for the 8th Army was handed over 
to the Director of Survey, Middle East. Navigation parties were provided for the 
advance and 46 Survey Company took its place permanently among Army Troops, 
with whom it was to continue serving with outstanding success.43  
Maintaining the closest contact with 285 Wing, Royal Air Force, the 
company covered 1 120 km during November, producing 70 maps representing 133 
000 impressions for 8th Army. The 46 Survey Company shouldered sole 
responsibility for the production of battle maps for 8th Army, providing the divisions 
with field sections for navigation and artillery survey, and obtained ground control 
for mapping enemy lines from aerial photographs. Having turned out a 1:200 000 
six-colour map in exceptionally good time, and printing 9 000 copies in 16 hours, 46 
Survey Company was released from 8th Army. It returned to Cairo to reorganise and 
refit before leaving for service in Europe.44 
5.3 The Italian Campaign, July 1943 – May 1945 
The last major theatre of operations in which South Africans participated 
during the Second World War was the Allied campaign in Italy, where conditions 
were very different to those of the North African theatre. Troops had to operate in 
mountainous country ideally suited to defensive warfare. In summer, rain and mud, 
in winter, snow and intense cold, impeded mobility and presented little scope for 
turning movements. This type of war made heavy demands on all arms, but 
particularly the Engineers.45 
The first SAEC unit to set foot on the European continent in World War II 
was Major G.E. Marriott’s 46 Survey Company. Now under command of the 5th 
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Army, the surveyors immediately began work on a considerable programme of map 
revision. Trigonometric control for the artillery on the whole Army front was in a 
bad state and affected the accuracy of the guns. Provision and maintaining of 
triangulation was carried out at such speed and precision that the accuracy of fire 
greatly improved. This was the beginning of a long period of most distinguished 
service rendered the Allied cause in Italy by South African surveyors and soon the 
highest authorities realised that no one but a highly qualified surveyor stood much 
chance of getting a commission in a South African survey unit. The standard of the 
ranks was also well above what was thought acceptable in British and American 
survey companies. The South Africans were primarily professional surveyors and 
not professional soldiers with some knowledge of survey and were far better 
qualified for intricate and accurate triangulation than their British or American 
counterparts, however good the latter might be at military map reading. The South 
African surveyors could cover the whole front more effectively than anyone else, 
identifying old or selecting new unmistakable reference points, and calculating their 
co-ordinates by survey for distribution to artillery and other units. They also 
prepared accurate maps from aerial photographs, updated existing Italian and other 
maps, and produced especially gridded aerial photographs for the Americans. The 
work of 46 Survey Company earned special appreciation, being amongst the first 
four recipients of the 5th US Army service plaque and clasp “for excellence in 
discipline, performance and merit” in making surveys along the entire army front 
and absorbing the normal function of an American topographic battalion.46 
The 49 Survey Company of Major J.H. Scott left Ladysmith in South Africa 
and, arriving in the Middle East on 18 December 1943, was placed under the 5th US 
Army in January 1944. Here they took over part of the map revision programme 
from 46 Survey Company and received a steady stream of orders for maps and 
enlargements. With the 49 Survey Company transferred to 8th Army, South African 
surveyors became responsible for surveying on both American 5th Army and the 
British 8th Army fronts. In addition, as a particular service to the air forces, 49 
Survey Company found the exact co-ordinates of selected distant targets in 
complicated conversions of the Yugoslav, Austrian and other grids to the Italian 
grid. This made computation of both flight time and exact course to a target from 
any airfield in Italy possible. With the complete Italian trigonometric data captured 
49 Survey Company checked and identified trigonometric stations for the 8th Army 
in addition to now routine map revision and map printing.  Neither the American nor 
the British artillery units could have done without the accurate trigonometric survey 
details provided by the two South African units and to the very end of the Italian 
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campaign remained dependant on the 46 and 49 Survey Companies for their primary 
survey information. The two lithographic sections attached to the survey companies, 
which had printed no fewer than 7 512 000 maps during their tour of duty, became 
non-operational during June 1945 and by the end of September were disbanded and 
all printing activities ceased. The 49 Survey Company was dissolved on 23 October 
1945.47  
6. The period 1946 – 1973 
All three survey units served with distinction throughout the war, after 
which 45 and 49 Survey Companies were disbanded and only 46 Survey Company, 
SAEC (ACF), established on 1 August 1946, continued as an active unit in the South 
African Army. During the post-war period (1946–1961) the Survey Company was 
split up on a regional basis with headquarters in Johannesburg and sections in Cape 
Town, Durban, Johannesburg and Stellenbosch. On 1 January 1954 the unit was 
renamed 46 Survey Squadron, SAEC and again on 31 January 1959 when it became 
46 Survey Squadron. From 1963 to 1968 the Squadron carried out extensive 
mapping tasks for both military and civilian purposes in the Transvaal and Namibia 
(formerly South West Africa). The 46 Survey Squadron has, since 1963, had very 
close links with the Survey and Mapping Chief Directorate, formerly 
Trigonometrical Survey, and much of its work has been of great value to both 
military and civilian surveyors.48  
After numerous establishments and disbandments of printing and survey 
elements in the SAEC, 4 Survey and Printing Regiment was formed on 1 January 
1967, as a unit for both the Permanent Force and Citizen Force.49 On 1 July 1969, 45 
Survey Squadron SAEC (CF) was re-established as a unit of the SA Army, with its 
headquarters in Pietermaritzburg. A small number of officers and men was detached 
and transferred from 46 Survey Squadron to form the nucleus of the new unit. The 
Squadron updated, from a military point of view, the 1:50 000 topographical maps 
of South Africa and Namibia, and the 1:10 000 orthophoto series in KwaZulu 
Natal.50 
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7. The war in Angola 
In August 1965 the first group of South West African People’s Organisation 
(SWAPO) insurgents entered Ovambo via Angola from Zambia. The South African 
Police and later the South African Defence Force tried to stem this growing tide and 
with the permission of the Portuguese government conducted cross border raids 
against SWAPO bases. In April 1974 the Portuguese government was ousted in a 
coup d’etat and a civil war broke out between the three Angolan freedom 
movements, União Nacional para Indepêndencia Total de Angola (UNITA), the 
Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) and Frente Nacional de 
Libertação de Angola (FNLA). With Russia backing the MPLA, and the USA 
supplying the FNLA and UNITA with weapons, South Africa became involved in 
the civil war on the side of UNITA and the FNLA.51 
During the initial stages of the South African involvement, the South 
Africans had no accurate maps and had to rely on xeroxed copies of popular road 
maps.  The reason for this sorry state of affairs was that the Portuguese were for 
many years friends of the Republic of South Africa and there seemed no reason to 
obtain maps of areas under their government. Low clouds, thick fog and generally 
overcast skies made the use of aerial photography for map compilation extremely 
difficult.52  
After a decision to separate the SAEC’s surveys and mapping 
responsibilities from the Quartermaster General’s printing function, 47 Survey 
Squadron under Major F.H. du Preez, was formed on 1 April 1975. The need for 
military survey and mapping of the SA Army at that time was to be satisfied by this 
Squadron. According to Orpen & Martin a Permanent Force nucleus was thus 
provided for a vital Sapper task which could become even more essential if the 
continuing “low intensity” conflict along the border should ever worsen.53 
These three survey squadrons executed all future survey and mapping needs 
of the South African Defence Force.  From 1975 the survey squadrons then became 
actively involved with survey and mapping tasks in Namibia and Angola. The lack 
of maps was overcome when usable maps of parts of the front used by the enemy 
fell into South African hands and were used by 47 Survey Squadron to produce, 
within 14 days, working 24 hours a day, a large number of maps of Southern 
Angola.  Ironically, some of these maps never reached the front and were found in 
unmarked boxes at Grootfontein after they vanished during transport to the 
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operational area. When the South African invasion force of Operation Savannha 
withdrew from Angola in 1976, a total of 752 million rand was spent on the 
production and distribution of maps.54  
During 1980 members of 47 Survey Squadron were deployed in Sectors 10, 
20 and 70 at Oshakati, Rundu and Mpacha respectively. These field-mapping offices 
had the responsibility to annotate, update, reproduce and supply maps as needed by 
the territorial forces. The surveyors or cartographic draughtsmen were also 
responsible for the preparation of target sketches and target enlargements for use 
during the planning of operations. In April 1979, 47 Survey Squadron received its 
first annual intake of national service women, and though trained internally as 
cartographic draughtsmen, they were never deployed in the Namibian operational 
area. As from 1981 surveyors surveyed terrain for the building and upgrading of 
military bases at Okanguati, Omauni, Ondangwa Air Base, 203 Battalion and 
elsewhere. In 1984 satellite surveying equipment was used for the first time to 
determine the correct co-ordinates of all airstrips in Sector 10. The following year 
beacons were surveyed and built at all military bases for air photo control and 
navigation. These beacons were used to calibrate all mobile navigation equipment 
used by the South African forces for accurate navigation during operations. This 
navigation network was later extended to Sector 20 as well as southeastern Angola.55  
During January and February 1976 as part of a feasibility study, the first 
terrain evaluation under military operational conditions in south-western Angola was 
carried out by two civilian scientists, Professor H.J. von M. Harmse of the 
Potchefstroom University for CHE (now Northwest University) and Dr D. Edwards 
of the National Botanical Institute of South Africa. This study confirmed the 
practicality of the system under operational conditions and also fulfilled the need for 
a rapid overall terrain analysis of the region. The culmination of this study 
eventually resulted in the formal establishment of a terrain trafficability troop under 
47 Survey Squadron, but stationed at Potchefstroom, where graduate national 
servicemen were trained at Potchefstroom University as terrain evaluators and 
advisers. After the first national service terrain evaluation officers completed their 
formal basic and specialist training in December 1983 they were placed in the 
Citizen Force. Both officers and supporting troops served in the SWA operational 
area at the various field-mapping offices until the end of the war. In the absence of 
formal terrain intelligence maps for countries outside the RSA, and to assist terrain 
evaluators and the military, work also started at the troop in Potchefstroom on the 
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preparation of a series of reconnaissance scale terrain maps, based on satellite 
imagery of which the total area covered eventually culminated to some two million 
square kilometres.56 
8. After the ‘Bush War’57 
During 1989, with the former South West Africa on its way to independence 
as Namibia, 47 Survey Squadron deployed for the first time a Mobile Terrain 
Intelligence Troop (MOBTIT), fitted in Samil 20 trucks, with the ground forces at 
Army Battle School. The MOBTIT was again deployed at Messina and De Brug 
during 1991 and thereafter annually to assist in the exercises at Army Battle School. 
In 1990 Project Atlanta became a reality for 47 Survey Squadron with the 
acquisition of a nine million rand computer assisted mapping system. This, the first 
of its type in the country, placed military mapping right in front with its civilian 
counterparts in an era of digital mapping techniques, integrated with computerised 
surveying, as opposed to the conventional hand-drawn methods in use since the start 
of the century. In 1992 the South African Defence Force commenced restructuring 
and the two citizen force squadrons, 45 and 46 Survey Squadrons, now 
commemorating their 50th anniversaries, were brought under command of 47 Survey 
Squadron, only to be amalgamated on 2 June 1992 into 4 Survey and Mapping 
Regiment as it is known today. 
Two major changes took place in 1994. Firstly, all the outlying squadrons, 
namely 45 and 46 Survey Squadrons, and the Terrain Trafficability Squadron were 
closed down and moved back to the Regiment HQ and secondly, the regiment 
moved to new premises at the SA Army Engineer Formation, where it resides today. 
In 1995 the MOBTIT was expanded with the addition of a Mobile Printing Section, 
now refitted into six-metre Cargo containers mounted on Samil 100 trucks to bring 4 
Survey and Mapping Regiment into play regarding the concept of mobile warfare. 
During March 1995 women members joined an all Engineer Corps field exercise 
‘Super Sapper’ at Bethlehem as staff of the MOBTIT for the first time, before 
partaking in a field exercise at Army Battle School later that same year.58 The 
MOBTIT has since been renamed the Tactical Terrain Intelligence Troop 
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(TACTIT), which was deployed operationally for the first time as part of the newly 
established South African National Defence Force's stabilisation force in Lesotho 
during May-November 1998, where it took full responsibility for all tactical 
mapping and printing requirements. 
Technologically 4 Survey and Mapping Regiment has advanced from an 
organisation that produced maps by hand to a unit that renders mapping by means of 
highly modernised equipment. Some of the latest additions to the unit are the Global 
Positioning Systems and the Geographical Information Systems. 
9. Conclusion: into the next millennium? 
The historical development of military topographic mapping in South Africa 
coincided with world-wide developments. The technological advances during each 
of the wars that saw South Africa participation can be clearly recognised. The South 
African military mapping support systems have come a long way since the 
inadequate maps of the Anglo Boer War. Today the South African National Defence 
Force have the ability to utilise the most advanced technology to provide military 
practitioners with the best decision-making tools available. The military can be 
rightly proud of the past achievements of its mapping units. The decorations these 
units received, the dedication with which they executed their tasks and the quality of 
products they delivered has done them proud. Without the mapping units the South 
African war operations would simply not have been as successful. 
It is also imperative to learn from past mistakes. It is not known where 
technological advances will lead to in the new millennium. In less than ten years 
hardcopy maps, as it is known today, may be replaced by small, handheld, palm-
sized super computers with the ability to communicate with satellites, bringing the 
most recent terrain data to the soldier on the battlefield within milliseconds. 
Whatever the case, never again can the South African National Defence Force afford 
to downscale its surveying and mapping abilities during peacetime. It is therefore of 
the utmost importance that the military utilises much of its peacetime effort in the 
preparation of maps and the building of a topographic database of its areas of 
interest. The wars of the future will be fought from electronic maps that will be the 
visualisation of the digital battlefields. The present crisis in Northern and Central 
Africa and South Africa’s involvement in peacekeeping operations there, are vivid 
reminders that the ability to supply soldiers with the best and most reliable maps 
possible, must be maintained. 
It is only fitting to conclude with a quotation by Frederick the Great on the 
importance of good terrain information and reconnaissance. In his Instructions to his 
Generals (1747) he stated that  
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“when it is desired to apply oneself to this essential part of war, the most 
detailed and exact maps of the country that can be found are taken and 
examined and re–examined frequently. If it is not in time of war, the places 
are visited, camps are chosen, roads are examined, the mayors of the 
villages, the butchers, and farmers are talked to. One becomes familiar with 
the footpaths, the depth of the rivers, the marshes that can be crossed and 
those which cannot… The road is chosen for such and such a march, the 
number of columns in which the march can be made estimated and all strong 
camping places on the route are examined”.59 
59  Heinl RD Jr 1966. Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations. United States Naval 
Institute.  Annapolis, Maryland. p 266. 
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